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A Total War of the Mind: the French Theory of la Guerre 
Révolutionnaire, 1954-1958 
 
Michael P.M. Finch, King’s College London 
 
With the COIN boom of the mid-2000s, the individual whose reputation received the most 
profound boost was David Galula, whose Counterinsurgency Warfare was reissued following acclaim 
from the authors of Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.1 In this manner, the work of a 
Frenchman whose major contributions were penned in the aftermath of France’s bitter wars of 
decolonization became a key reference point in the new COIN era. Yet as Etienne de Durand 
has argued, Galula was never a significant presence in his native land. Rather, he was 
overshadowed by a host of more significant theorists who were not even inclined to describe 
their military-intellectual pursuits as counter-insurgency, preferring such terms as guerre en surface, 
guerre subversive, guerre psychologique, and above all guerre révolutionnaire.2 In the same year that 
Counterinsurgency Warfare was rediscovered, however, a more representative French work was also 
reissued, Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare. In its English translation Modern Warfare carried the 
subtitle A French View of Counterinsurgency. This framed Trinquier’s work explicitly within a 
recognisable counterinsurgency debate. Yet the scope of Trinquier’s theory of war applied much 
more broadly than to the subset of warfare that the addition of the word ‘counterinsurgency’ 
seemed to suggest. It is true that his work was inspired by imperial experiences and reflected 
those aspects of warfare that the French had faced in the 1950s: terrorism, clandestine 
organisations, guerrilla operations. Nevertheless, the operational approach that he advocated was 
framed within a certain concept of war, the nature of which, he believed, had been permanently 
                                                          
1 United States. Dept of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual: U.S. Army field manual no. 
3-24 (Chicago, 2007), xix. D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport CT, 2006). A new 
introduction from FM 3-24 co-author John Nagl likened the work to the best of sex manuals. 
2 E. de Durand, ‘France’ in T. Rid and T. Kearney (eds.), Understanding Counterinsurgency: doctrine, operations and challenges 
(Abingdon, 2010), 16-17. Indeed, it is testament to Galula’s lowly status that Counterinsurgency Warfare appeared in a 
French translation for the first time in 2008. Like his other major work, Pacification in Algeria, it was originally written 
in English for an American audience. For Galula’s transatlantic trajectory following Algeria see A. Marlowe, ‘David 
Galula: His Life and Intellectual Context’ (SSI Monograph, August 2010), E. Tenenbaum, ‘From Galula to Petraeus: 
The French Legacy in the US Counterinsurgency Doctrine’ (CDEF Cahier de la recherche doctrinale, July 2010) 
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altered. The subtitle should not obscure this: Trinquier thought that he was talking about 
modern warfare, not simply counterinsurgency. 
  ‘We still persist,’ he wrote ‘in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall 
never fight again, while we pay only passing attention to the war we lost in Indochina and the 
one we are about to lose in Algeria.’ Trinquier’s point was not that all wars were now colonial, 
but that these colonial wars had unmasked the true nature of modern warfare. This warfare, 
without fronts or pitched battles, would be ‘subversive’ or ‘revolutionary’: 
 
Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions – political, economic, 
psychological, military – that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country 
and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit 
the internal tensions of the country attacked – ideological, social, religious economic 
– any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be 
conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day interdependence of nations, any 
residual grievance within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, 
will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great 
world conflict. From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they 
will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict.3 
 
  This essay focuses on the war that the French revolutionary war theorists thought that they 
were fighting: the modern war of which the colonial aspect was but one part. In so doing, it 
argues that the theorists of the 1950s considered their fight as a total war, considers the 
parameters of their concept of totality, and suggests that the roots of this tendency to think in 
total terms lay less in the colonial sphere than the metropolitan sphere. ‘Total War’ is a 
notoriously slippery concept. As Roger Chickering has observed, the idea of ‘Total War’ has 
                                                          
3 R. Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York, 2006), 3, 5. 
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meant different things to different people, even amongst belligerents involved in wars generally 
considered to have been ‘total.’4 Far from ascribing to the more generally accepted meta-
narrative of the expansion of total war culminating in the global conflict that spanned the years 
1939 to 1945, the total war that the revolutionary war theorists described rested on a belief about 
the scale of a global subversive war which they contended had been underway since 1917, and 
for which France’s post-1945 colonial wars were the most tangible evidence. Given the stakes of 
such a conflict for the Western world, the theorists were beholden to an escalatory logic which 
suggested that only greater levels of popular support and mobilisation and more ruthless 
methods of pursuing the fight would guarantee the security not just of the Empire, but of France 
herself.  
  In this manner, owing to their capacity to rationalise and unify their experiences in colonial 
wars, the revolutionary war theorists forged a link between security abroad and security at home 
which stood in marked contrast to the experiences of the British Army, whose analogous 
conflicts in Asia and Africa were not subject to a similar process.5 This was in part a reflection of 
the stakes and scale of the wars in Indochina and Algeria. Unlike other conflicts of 
decolonization, the wars in Indochina and Algeria pulled in hundreds of thousands, rather than 
tens of thousands of combatants. The Algerian War, moreover, involved the use of French 
national servicemen from 1956 onward, so that by the war’s end over a million conscripts had 
seen service there.6 Algeria’s unique status, enshrined in the 1875 constitution of Third Republic, 
                                                          
4 R. Chickering, ‘Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept’ in M. Boemeke, R. Chickering, and S. Förster, 
Anticipating Total War: the German and American experiences, 1871-1914 (Washington DC, Cambridge, 1999), 17. Indeed, 
the same is true of scholars: Chickering and Förster’s five volume series investigating total war from the American 
Civil War to the Second World War yielded no generally agreed definition. For a historiographical review of those 
volumes see T. Imlay, ‘Total War’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (June, 2007), 547-570. 
5 As David French has recently pointed out, aside from the Malaya Emergency most of the British Army’s post-
Second World War counter-insurgency campaigns were not fought against Maoist insurgencies. Despite the 
emergence of a ‘Malaya model’ for counter-insurgency operations, codified in army manuals and popularized by 
Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), ‘British counter-insurgency operations in reality differed 
considerably from the ‘ideal-type’ as defined by Thompson and refined by subsequent analysts’ (247) Moreover, the 
army proved as liable to forget ‘lessons’that might have been transmitted across campaigns as to learn from them. 
See D. French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford, 2011), 42-58, 200-219, 247-50. 
6 M.Thomas, Fight or Flight. Britain, France, and their roads from Empire, (Oxford, 2014), 8, 298-9. 
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as a legal part of French sovereign territory, helped make this possible.7 It also played a role in 
facilitating a particularly shocking dynamic of violence. In the words of Martin Thomas, ‘The 
Algerian War was longer, bigger and nastier than anything in the British experience.’8 For soldiers 
such as Trinquier, the experience of Algeria compounded that of Indochina. They became 
‘centurions’, a reference to Jean Lartéguy’s popular 1960 novel of the same name and a 
soubriquet for ‘the hard-bitten French regular who had survived the Indochina war, had learned 
his Mao Tse-tung the hard way, and later had sought to apply his lessons in Algeria or even in 
mainland France.’9 In the minds of the revolutionary war theorists, these conflicts only served to 
lay bare how misguided the blinkered focus on atomic rivalry really was. The process of 
intellectual totalization to which they succumbed, meanwhile, played a role in radicalizing the 
French Army during the Algerian War, producing an institution willing to employ torture as a 
military expedient, and willing even to take France to the brink of civil war.10 
  French revolutionary war theory has not been subject to exhaustive scrutiny since its demise 
with the end of the Algerian War of independence, especially in the English language. The most 
concentrated period of attention came in the immediate aftermath of the Algerian War, during 
which time several tomes emerged. Foremost amongst these was Peter Paret’s excellent and 
concise analysis, which built upon two insightful journal articles published during the war itself, 
very shortly after the theory had reached peak influence.11 Works by the political theorists 
George Armstrong Kelly and John Steward Ambler followed in 1965 and 1966 respectively.12 
                                                          
7 M. Evans, Algeria: France's undeclared war, (Oxford, 2012), 19. 
8 Thomas, Fight or Flight, 315. 
9 Preface by Bernard B. Fall in Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. xi. Lartéguy was fairly prolific in his output: Les 
Centurions was followed by a slew of works with issues relating to soldiers and empire at their core. See, D. 
O’Connell, ‘Jean Lartéguy: A Popular Phenomenon’, The French Review, 45, 6 (May, 1972), 1087-1097. 
10 Trinquier was amongst those unapologetic over the use of torture, having been instrumental in devising ruthless 
plans for the battle of Algiers during which torture was utilized as a military expedient. Likewise, in Modern Warfare 
he did not shy away from stressing its utility. B. Reis, ‘David Galula and Roger Trinquier. Two warrrier-scholars, one 
French late-colonial counterinsurgency?’ in A. Mumford and B. Reis (eds.), The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: 
Warrior-Scholarship in Counterinsurgency (Abingdon, 2014), 40-41. 
11 P. Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York, 1964). P. Paret, ‘The French Army and La 
Guerre Révolutionnaire,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 104/613 (Feb., 1959), 59-69. P. Paret, ‘A Total 
Weapon of Limited War,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 105/617 (Feb., 1960), 62-69. 
12 G.A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962 (Cambridge MA, 1965), J.S. Ambler, The 
French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (Columbus OH, 1966) 
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Thereafter academic interest in the subject went into decline. This situation changed somewhat 
following the emergence of the new counter-insurgency debate. In 2007 Christopher Craddock 
and M.L.R. Smith published an analysis of the influence of revolutionary war theory on the 
Battle of Algiers, partly inspired by Kelly’s earlier claim that ‘the victory of Algiers was an 
undisputed success of guerre révolutionnaire’, although for reasons of space they did not dwell at 
length on the theory itself.13 Most recently, as part of a wider critique of the fallacies of modern 
counter-insurgency, Douglas Porch devoted a chapter of his Counterinsurgency to the 
‘radicalization and collapse’ of the French school under the weight of politicization and 
psychological warfare, paying particular attention to Galula’s work.14 
  All of these writers make passing reference either to ‘totality’ in French revolutionary war 
theory or to the theorists’ view that the West was already engaged in a new global war. Craddock 
and Smith note that the theory ‘purported to redefine the character of war and its primary 
objectives. The central tenet of the guerre révolutionnaire was that the nature of contemporary war 
had changed radically.’15 Likewise, Porch remarks that ‘small wars were also considered unlimited 
ones, especially for officers of the 5e bureau who believed that they were waging a guerre totale 
against communist-orchestrated insurgency, in which it was difficult to distinguish friend from 
foe.’16 These features were equally apparent to Paret, who saw that ‘the French solution of the 
problems presented by insurrectional war may be characterized as a total effort, carried on 
aggressively in every area of human activity’, later noting that the psychological arm offered ‘a 
total weapon of limited war’ which brought ‘physical and psychological brutality in its wake.’17  
  This essay, by contrast, places the issue of totality centre stage in an effort to better understand 
what the French revolutionary war theorists understood by total war. The first section explores 
                                                          
13 C. Craddock, and M.L.R. Smith, ‘“No fixed values”: A Reinterpretation of the Influence of the Theory of Guerre 
révolutionnaire and the Battle of Algiers, 1956-1957’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 9, 4 (Autumn 2007), 68-105, 74, 83. 
Kelly, Lost Soldiers, 191. 
14 D. Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, 2013), 153-200. 
15 Craddock and Smith, ‘“No fixed values”’, 74. 
16 Porch, Counterinsurgency, 181. 
17 Paret, ‘The French Army’, 64. Paret, ‘A Total Weapon’, 64-8. 
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the emergence of French revolutionary war theory in the early 1950s as a response to the 
Indochina War. It focuses on Charles Lacheroy’s idea of parallel hierarchies, an attempt to 
understand the Communist revolutionary warfare practiced by the Viet Minh, the ‘totalizing’ 
aspects of which have been underscored in recent scholarship. The next two sections explore the 
dimensions of totality in the writings of some key revolutionary war thinkers: not only in the 
work of Charles Lacheroy, but particularly in the writings of Jacques Hogard and Jean Némo 
which appeared in French military journals during the period 1956-1958. These sections explore 
the manner in which the revolutionary war was thought to have fundamentally altered the nature 
of war itself, creating a unitary global struggle of many conflicts, where the French colonial 
experience constituted the opening shock. The insidiousness of this war was enhanced by the 
manner in which it tore down the barriers between the states of war and peace, leading to the 
ultimate conclusion that the global revolutionary war was already taking place not just abroad, 
but at home. With the general populace unaware of this new reality, the responsibility fell on the 
army to ‘re-educate’ them. Having examined the output of the revolutionary war theorists, the 
final section considers the origins of this development in French military thought. It contends 
that the inspiration for this radical path is to be found less in the continuation and development 
of pre-Second World War colonial military thought and more in intellectual and military currents 
rooted in pre-War Europe, particularly in reactions to totalitarianism. 
 
Recent work by Christopher Goscha has shown that the Viet Minh’s transition from guerrilla to 
conventional warfare was a key component in creating ‘one of the most ‘totalizing’ wars in the 
history of twentieth-century decolonization.’18 Such a transition was in line with the Maoist 
theory of revolutionary war. Just as Mao Tse-tung had argued that guerrilla operations were ‘but 
one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle’, so Vo Nguyen Giap, the 
director of the military effort against the French in Vietnam, professed a similar awareness of the 
                                                          
18 C. Goscha, ‘A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization? Social Mobilization and State-Building in Communist Vietnam 
(1949-54)’, War & Society, 31, 2 (Aug., 2012), 138. 
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fluidity between the guerrilla and the regular. The protracted revolutionary war against the 
French was carried out as ‘a long and sweeping guerrilla war proceeding from simple to complex 
guerrilla warfare then to mobile warfare in the last years of the Resistance.’ This was a product of 
circumstance, whereby the Viet Minh had to content themselves with building towards decisive, 
pitched battles.19 Achieving this goal required not only the creation of a modern regular army but 
also called for mass mobilization. Hence mandatory military service was initiated in 1949, a state 
of general mobilization was declared in 1950, and full-scale land reform was implemented by 
1953-4 to incentivize fighting for the peasant majority. Manpower was at the heart of 
mobilization, and was all the more important given that the Viet Minh lacked the means to 
pursue mechanized, air, and naval operations. In addition, since it was underpinned by a 
communist political philosophy, this war effort also had to transform the society in which it took 
place: ‘Not only would the totalizing efforts of the conflict expand horizontally in terms of 
mobilizing ‘everyone’ and ‘everything’, but it would also become vertically ‘totalitarian’ as the 
party sought to take control of the state and the society from the top down.’20 
  Whilst it has been remarked upon that for indigenous participants colonial wars usually tended 
towards totality, Goscha’s work, in focusing on mobilization for war and the transformation of 
society, takes the argument in a different direction.21 It departs from the confines of a total war 
narrative often understood to have reached its culminating point 
in the extremes of destruction meted out in the World Wars of the twenieth century, and 
particularly between 1939 and 1945. Approached within the conventional chronology, scholarly 
efforts to underline the colonial contribution to the World Wars of the twentieth century have 
tended to focus on the foreshadowing offered by extremes of violence, racial attitudes and 
genocidal practices. A number of chapters in the five-volume series on Total War spanning the 
                                                          
19 V.N. Giap, People’s War, People’s Army (2nd Edn. Hanoi, 1974), 55, 57. See also Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare 
(Urbana IL, 2000), 41, 54-5, 57. 
20 Goscha, ‘A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization?, 138-140. 
21 On this point, see H. Strachan, ‘On Total War and Modern War’, The International History Review, 22, 2 (Jun., 2000), 
354-5. H.L. Wesseling, ‘Colonial Wars: An Introduction’ in J.A. de Moor & H.L. Wesseling (eds.), Imperialism and 
War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa (Leiden, 1989), 1-11. 
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years 1861 to 1945, under the various editorship of Stig Förster, Roger Chickering, Bernd 
Greiner, Manfred Boemeke, and Jörg Nagler, offer a case in point.22 Here, the foreshadowing of 
total war appears in the manifestation of violence inflicted upon indigenous peoples: they are a 
target in the breakdown of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant. By contrast, 
Goscha’s conception allows the indigenous people to become agents of a totalizing conflict 
because it places mobilization and social transformation at its core. 
  The foundation of the French theory of revolutionary war lay in the same discovery, as the 
professional army assessed its defeat in Vietnam. The founding figure of the movement, Charles 
Lacheroy, came late to Indochina, after almost a quarter of a century’s service in other parts of 
the French Empire. A graduate of Saint-Cyr in 1927, Lacheroy’s decision to join the colonial 
infantry took him to the Upper Volta, Syria, and then to Morocco, where he commanded an 
Aerial Observation Group at the outbreak of the Second World War. After the Armée d’Afrique 
came over to the Allies in November 1942, he fought in Italy under General Alphonse Juin, and 
subsequently in Provence and into Germany under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, whom he 
had first met earlier in the war. It was de Lattre who called Lacheroy to Indochina in 1951, but 
not before the latter had garnered a first taste of colonial soldiering in the post-war world, taking 
command of an autonomous battalion (bataillon autonome), operating against forces of the 
Rassemblement démocratique africain in the Ivory Coast.  
  Arriving in Vietnam, Lacheroy was given a sector command at Bien Hôa in Cochinchina. 
Afforded a view of the war from the ground up, he was immediately struck by the manner in 
which the enemy seemed at once to be everywhere and nowhere, and how areas nominally under 
                                                          
22 The most relevant articles are: R.M. Utley, ‘Total War on the American Indian Frontier’, T. von Trotha, ‘“The 
Fellows Can Just Starve”: On Wars of “Pacification” in the African Colonies of Imperial Germany and the Concept 
of “Total War”’, G.A. May, ‘Was the Philippine-American War a “Total War”?’, S. Dabringhaus, ‘An Army on 
Vacation? The German War in China, 1900-1901’ in M. Boemeke, R. Chickering, and S. Förster, Anticipating Total 
War: the German and American experiences, 1871-1914 (Cambridge, 1999), 399-414, 415-435, 437-458, 459-476. Perhaps 
tellingly, these four chapters combined form the section entitled ‘The Experience of War.’ Giulia Kunzi’s 
contribution to the fourth volume in the series, on the Italian invasion of Ethiopia of 1935-6, concentrates more 
directly on Italian mobilization and warfare as a prelude to the events of the Second World War, an approach which 
can be framed in a more ‘regular’ paradigm since both sides were legitimate states recognized by the League of 
Nations. See G.B. Künzi, ‘Total Colonial Warfare: Ethiopia’ in R. Chickering and S. Förster (eds.), The Shadows of 
Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939 (Cambridge, 2003), 313-326. 
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French control during daylight hours ceased to be so once night fell. These observations 
sounded a note of dissonance: how could it be that the French, given their numerical and 
material superiority, were not winning this war? The idea of ‘parallel hierarchies’ was Lacheroy’s 
answer: first conveyed to fellow officers in the Bien Hôa sector in late 1952, it was to be the 
fundamental building block of the French idea of revolutionary war.23  
  As Lacheroy saw it, Viet Minh success was predicated on the ability to assume control of the 
population in both body and spirit. This approach was guided by the notion that there was no 
such thing as a free individual. Instead, human beings could be divided into three categories: 
militaire, fonctionnaire, or member of a state association. For the militaire or fonctionnaire loyalty was 
not an issue since the individual would at all times be under the eye of the party, or of comrades 
only too willing to denounce one another for the slightest failing. The civil population, 
meanwhile, could be bound to the party from the cradle to the grave through five basic state 
associations – masculine youth, feminine youth, old persons, peasants and non-peasants. This 
was the basis of the first of the parallel hierarchies: a hierarchy of associations which sought to 
group individuals according to their sex, age, tastes, needs, and which operated up the levels 
from the village, through the canton, sub-prefecture and prefecture, to the state, with a general 
staff at each level directing those below and receiving orders from those above. To this hierarchy 
of associations was added a territorial hierarchy corresponding more with traditional social 
organisation, again operating at all levels from the village, through canton, sub-prefecture and so 
on. In contrast to Western territorial organisation, however, Lacheroy argued that the Vietminh 
system substituted collective for individual responsibility, enforced at all levels by responsables for 
different areas - effectives, intendance, youth, propaganda – in a manner which loosely mirrored 
the French army’s first, second, and third bureaux responsibilities.24 
                                                          
23 P. Villatoux, ‘Le colonel Lacheroy, théoricien de l’action psychologique’, in J-Ch. Jauffret (ed.), Des hommes et des 
femmes en guerre d’Algérie (Paris, 2003), 494-500. 
24 C. Lacheroy, ‘La Guerre Révolutionnaire’ in G. Albord et al, La Défense Nationale (Paris, 1958),  312-314. The four 
bureaux of the General Staff, constituted by a decree of 1874 consisted of: I - personnel, II – intelligence, III – 
10 
 
  These hierarchies aimed at control of the civilian individual, which would allow for 
appropriately targeted propaganda: 
 
In other words, in the first case, one has taken the people overall: the man in his 
family, the family in its group of houses, the group of houses in its village. In the 
second case, one redistributes the people differently: one distributes them by 
individual; one considers them as a man or women of a certain age and of a certain 
level or of a certain milieu. This relative homogeneity amongst associations makes them receptive 
to similar propaganda.25 
 
They were complemented by a third and final hierarchy which, unlike the first two, was selective, 
incorporating no more than one tenth of the population - the party hierarchy - constituting a 
controlling body of fanatics who ‘pull all the strings, direct all the heads, all activities military, 
civil, or of the state associations.’26 
  These parallel hierarchies constituted the fundamental means by which psychological 
propaganda could be made effective: control over bodies ensured control over minds. Lacheroy 
likened this to pouring liquid into a glass: ‘when one holds a glass firmly, one pours into it what 
one wishes, but if the glass shakes, if it is held crooked, one does not pour much liquid into it.’27 
A firm grip over these empty vessels allowed for the dissemination of propaganda on both a 
large scale – the mobilization of the population through the introduction of ‘independence’ and 
‘patriot’ into the public discourse – and a small scale – the ideological conversion of individual 
prisoners and non-conformists.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
operations & training, IV – logistics. See D. Ralston, The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political 
Evolution of France, 1871-1914 (Cambridge MA, 1967), 143. 
25 Ibid, 314-315. 
26 Ibid, 316. 
27 Ibid, 317. 
28 Ibid, 317-321. 
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  From this base, Lacheroy developed a general schema for how a revolutionary war unfurled, 
adopting a five phase process which he dubbed a scénario-type de guerre révolutionnaire, and which 
progressed as follows. In the first phase a problem is created through shocking and random acts 
of violence: bomb blasts and assassinations. The unexplained nature of these acts cause great 
confusion, and their impact is amplified worldwide by press agencies and radio broadcasts. In the 
next phase a recognisable agenda begins to take shape, as assassinations are carried out against 
individuals labelled ‘traitors’ to the rebel cause. Low-level individuals are purposefully targeted, 
to make clear to the average person that they too might become a future target: ‘the murders of a 
general, a caïd, a bachaga or a prefect, would not affect the population, whereas the assassination 
of a park warden concerns them enormously, because tomorrow, or the day after, it could be the 
turn of anyone.’ This phase then culminates in what Lacheroy terms ‘the battle for the complicity 
of silence’, as police action becomes increasingly ineffective in the face of a population unwilling 
to comply with investigations for fear they might be next. From this point, the third phase 
arrives. Here, the revolutionary war moves to a higher stage, encompassing both a civil and 
military aspect. In military terms, the first armed elements are created, although they appear little 
different from the regular population: ‘It will be a soldier on the street corner, a soldier in the 
village, a little guérillero, who will be able to act easily because no-one will denounce him.’ 
Likewise in the civil sphere, the political commissars of the revolutionary force now begin to 
operate on the population in an effort to transform their passivity into activity. In the fourth 
phase the civil and military structures gain in complexity: armed forces form sections or 
companies that begin to operate beyond the confines of a single village, whilst civil elements 
grow and specialise according to different needs, addressing such problems as money, authority 
or justice. Finally, phase five marks the point at which the system attains perfection. On the 
military front, the revolutionaries can now support a force encompassing not only guerrillas, but 
also provincial and regular troops. The civil organisation, meanwhile, becomes ever more 
complex as a rival regime is instituted: ‘beside each official is found, like a shadow, a person bis 
12 
 
who doubles him and who, little by little, drains the substance of his official status by rendering 
all his decisions unenforceable.’29 
  Lacheroy returned to France in the summer of 1953 to take up a position as director of the 
Centre d’études asiatiques et africaines (CEAA) at the Lourcine barracks in Paris. Over the next few 
years, fortune seemed to favour him. In August 1954 his ideas gained wider public renown when 
Le Monde published extracts from his conference entitled ‘La campagne d’Indochine, ou une 
leçon de guerre révolutionnaire.’ The following year at the CEAA he taught the young sons of 
Marshal Juin and General Guillaume (then chief of the General Staff), who offered favourable 
reports to their fathers about what their mentor had taught them. Lacheroy was called to set-out 
his theories before Guillaume and the General Staff, joining the General Staff himself shortly 
thereafter, and gaining another influential supporter in the form of Maurice Bourgès-Manoury, 
minister for National Defence in 1956-7.30 Where the conflict in Indochina had laid the 
foundations, the escalating war in Algeria lent revolutionary war theory the gloss of broader 
relevance. It enhanced the immediacy of the cause, presenting an opportunity to frame the new 
war in the context of the last, as well as to learn from the mistakes of the past in the new defence 
of la France d’Outre-mer.31 Accordingly, Lacheroy attempted to capitalize on the situation, pushing 
for the creation ‘fifth bureaux’ for psychological action at all levels of the military hierarchy in 
Algeria. In 1956 he was made President of the Comité d’action psychologique de la Défense nationale, 
and the following year he was made head of the inter-ministerial commission on psychological 
action of the Secrétariat general permanent de la Défense national.32 
  From 1956 to 1958, just as the Algerian war was escalating, so in the intellectual realm 
consideration and examination of the revolutionary war flourished and expanded. Only two years 
previously, students at the Ecole de Guerre were criticized ‘for the extent to which experiences in 
                                                          
29 Ibid, 322-324. 
30 Villatoux, ‘Le colonel Lacheroy’, 500-504. 
31 No matter that the comparison was, to a large extent, erroneous. See C-R. Ageron, ‘Les guerres d’Indochine et 
d’Algérie au miroir de la “guerre révolutionnaire”’, in C-R. Ageron and M. Michel (eds.), L’ère des décolonisations (Paris, 
1995), 47-66. 
32 Villatoux, ‘Le colonel Lacheroy’, 500-504. 
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Indo-China had influenced and ‘deformed’ their military judgment.’ By 1956, however, 
acceptance of the theory of revolutionary war was becoming ‘widespread and official.’33 In 
Algeria, the army’s Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla (CIPCG) at Arzew, 
near Oran, opened in June 1956. Over the follow years its curriculum became increasingly 
heavily weighted towards revolutionary warfare and psychological techniques, and away from 
tactical instruction.34 Yet as Lacheroy ascended to become the figurehead for the group so his 
contribution dried up in print. The substance of his ideas had been moulded and written in 1953-
4: thereafter it seemed not to change significantly. When the Revue Militaire d’Information published 
an issue solely devoted to revolutionary war in 1957 Lacheroy offered a seal of approval with his 
foreword, but he did not provide an original contribution. Instead, the debate was taken up by a 
new cohort of officers writing across several military journals, and amongst whom Jacques 
Hogard and Jean Némo stand out as the most prolific and far-reaching investigators. 
 
For some of those writing on revolutionary war in the mid-1950s, the Indochina and Algeria 
conflicts were but the most salient contemporary incarnations of a form of warfare much in 
evidence. In the special issue of the Revue Militaire d’Information of 1957, for example, beside the 
Indochinese experience, extended consideration was given to Greece, Iran, and Tunisia.35 
Moreover, a table entitled ‘some revolutionary wars of the 20th century’ listed a host of irregular 
conflicts from the Russian revolution onwards, presented in such a manner as to show that 
revolutionary movements failed as often as they succeeded, including - as far as the journal’s 
editors were concerned - the FLN in Algeria.36 Outside the Revue Militaire d’Information, other 
                                                          
33 Paret, ‘The French Army’, 65. See also Girardet, ‘Civil and Military Power’, 132-3. 
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35 Capitaine Labignette, ‘L’Insurrection Communiste en Grece’, H. Carrere d’Encausse, ‘Le Tudeh Iranien’, A. 
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writers were keen to cast the net still further back in time, succumbing to the temptation to see 
echoes of revolutionary war stretching back to antiquity.37 
  Jacques Hogard thought differently. A graduate of the Saint-Cyr promotion of 1939-1940, 
Hogard served with the colonial infantry in Indochina almost constantly between the years 1945 
and 1953, working in particular with indigenous forces created by the newly-designated 
associated states in the early 1950s: first the 6th battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens and then the 4th 
battalion of Chasseurs Cambodgiens. Returning to France, he taught under Lacheroy at the CEAA, 
taking charge of lessons in the Vietnam section, before moving on to teach for a further two 
years at the Ecole supérieure de guerre. These years afforded him the opportunity to publish 
extensively and to take up a role as chief editor of the Instruction provisoire sur l’emploi de l’arme 
psychologique (TTA 117), published at the end of 1956.38 
  For Hogard it was apparent that understanding revolutionary warfare lay not in waking up to a 
latent mode of warfare apparent throughout human history, but rather in realizing that warfare 
itself had been transformed. As he explained in an article for the Revue de Défense Nationale in 
December 1956: 
 
We are in the presence of a transformation more radical still than that imposed by 
the French revolution on the political and military conceptions of the age: war has 
become permanent, universal, and truly “total”. It is up to us, in imitation of 
European peoples at the beginning of the 19th century, to learn from the enemy, to 
                                                          
37 See for example, G. Bonnet, Les Guerres Insurrectionnelles et Révolutionnaires, de l’antiquité à nos jours (Paris, 1958), Col 
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38 See, M-C. Villatoux, ‘Hogard et Némo: deux théoriciens de la « guerre révolutionnaire »’, Revue Historique des 
Armées, No.232 (2003), 20-22. 
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consent to transformations and sacrifices indispensable to our security, and to forge 
the new tactics which will bring victory. 
 
This revolution in the art of war went hand in hand with a particular concept of the 
revolutionary war, which had to be understood at a higher level than individual ‘subversive’ or 
‘insurrectional’ conflicts. This was ‘the war of the revolution for the conquest of the world […] 
directed against all foreign forces, whether they resist or whether they want to remain neutral.’ 
The forms of this revolutionary war differed according to the demands of communist strategy, 
which explained the manner in which ‘hot revolutionary wars’, which flared constantly ‘here and 
there around the globe’, made up ‘the revolutionary war.’39 Thus, an understanding of modern 
warfare which attempted binary distinctions missed the point: 
 
It is useless to oppose the terms “revolutionary war” and “classic war” (atomic or 
not), to talk of “subversive” or “insurrectional” war in terms of current conflicts. 
“The revolutionary war” has begun. It has its mechanism and its own rules, even if it 
takes on, locally, episodically, such as in Korea, an aspect of conventional 
operations, even if it becomes a third world conflict one day. Its mechanism, its rules 
are sufficiently new and efficient so that there may be, in addition to the “war of the 
revolution”, a “revolution in the art of war” which is manifest in the conduct of all 
the current local revolutionary wars.40 
 
  Two years later, the problem of how to understand the revolutionary war was still uppermost in 
Hogard’s mind. In a piece entitled ‘Cette guerre de notre temps’ (‘This war of our time’), he 
mused that all such qualifiers – ‘cold’, ‘ideological’, ‘psychological’ – only served to ‘demonstrate 
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40 Ibid, 1509. 
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how much the notion of “peacetime” seems outmoded, how much we feel engaged confusingly 
in a general conflict. […] Are we to believe that we have not yet understood what has happened 
to us?’41 Inasmuch as he believed that such terms did not do justice to the scope of the modern 
war, his answer was yes. An ‘ideological’ war might be ‘cold’ or ‘hot’; classic, nuclear, or 
subversive. Similarly, when seen in terms of achieving a goal, all wars were psychological by 
nature: ‘all wars are ultimately wars “of persuasion.”’ The only acceptable use of the term 
‘psychological war’ was ‘if it refers uniquely to the use of one weapon amongst others.’ As for 
‘cold’ war: ‘Ever since it arose in the years following the second world conflict, the noise of the 
cannon has not ceased to make itself heard on some point of the globe […] so “Cold” war does 
not merit its name.’42 
  In rejecting all such qualifications, Hogard’s understanding of the modern war led him towards 
a unified concept: 
 
The war of today, of yesterday and of tomorrow is only one. The world has been in 
an uninterrupted war since 1917; no one can predict the end of the conflict. There 
are no different wars, different forms of war. Qualifiers deceive us. If there must 
absolutely be one, the only one which is suitable would be that which expresses the 
nature of the war of our time, the term chosen by those who conceived and incited it, 
those who conduct it, it would be the adjective: “REVOLUTIONARY”. But why a 
qualifier? War today is what it always has been. Quite simply, it assumes the visage 
and the scope given to it by conditions of the moment. 
Inexpiable and permanent because it is ideological, pursuing the destruction of all that 
is foreign to communism and the construction of a new humanity, universal because 
it is driven by a subversive organisation spreading all over the globe; total because it 
uses and combines all available forces, already resorting where it must, where it is 
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possible, to traditional forms of violence (terrorism, guerrilla, classic operations), one 
day perhaps to nuclear weapons, the war of our time is in keeping with Clausewitz’s 
ideal: it is chameleon-war, WAR in all senses of the word.43 
 
  Hogard was not alone in emphasizing the transformation of warfare. As mentioned above, 
Roger Trinquier, in pointing out the obsolescence of regular wars in the face of ‘the great world 
conflict’, thought in similar terms.44 Likewise, Lieutenant-Colonel Bruge, head of the CIPCG 
between the summer of 1957 and the summer of 1959, believed that the defeat of an enemy who 
was conducting a ‘more total war than that of 1939-45’ required ‘a response that was every bit as 
“total”.’45 Lacheroy also subscribed to the idea: not only France, but the West as a whole needed 
to face up to ‘a new form of war, new in its concepts and new in its achievements’, which would 
decide the fate of the world. This was emphatically a total war, ‘because it is a war, which takes 
souls as well as bodies and bends them to obedience and to the war effort.’46 Yet this was not 
simply an issue of mobilisation. The totality of the revolutionary war reflected both in its scale 
and its relevance to the global struggle against communism. In this regard, Lacheroy warned his 
contemporaries not to labour under any illusions. If they thought that the dropping of the 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima had signalled the beginning of an era in which war would revolve 
uniquely around a game of presse-bouton, then they were quite wrong. The record of French 
engagement in ‘varied forms of conflict, insurrectional conflict, ideological conflict, etc.’ 
demonstrated that, ‘more than in any other age and more than in all other forms of conflict – 
human values are revealed as dominant.’47 
  He recounted how, prior to leaving for Indochina, he was told by one of his superiors that he 
had nothing to learn there:  
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Nothing to learn on the strategic level, for you will be dealing with a strategy of ants 
which is completely outmoded in modern wars. Nothing to learn on the tactical 
level, for you will be dealing with out-of-date tactics, which have more in common with 
the wars of ’70 and ’14-18, than that of ’39-45, itself already so outdated.48 
 
In reality it was such metropolitan-minded thinking which was outmoded: conflicts in the 
colonies held the key to contemporary and future war. To illustrate the point, Lacheroy related 
an apocryphal story set at an annual international summit on Western defence, during which 
discussions of atomic war scenarios dominated. When asked what he thought of the decisions 
taken, The French representative replied: ‘nothing’. Pressed further by his shocked co-delegates, 
he proceeded to relay a sketch in which Khrushchev and Bulganin react to the decisions made at 
the conference: 
 
Bulganin says to Khrushchev: “They’ve played a nice krieg-spiel over there, except 
that we don’t care about the atomic bomb: we won’t use it. – Yes, says Khrushchev, 
the atomic bomb: we won’t use it, that’s right, but they have taken a very serious 
decision, to use the atomic bomb first, if we were to attack. – We don’t care, says 
Bulganin, we won’t attack them. – What, says Khrushchev, we won’t attack them? 
So, we betray? We betray Lenin? We betray the expansion of world communism? – 
No, don’t worry, we will betray nothing at all. There will always be war. But we, 
because we are communists, because we are used to this regime and its formulas, 
because we have a considerable lead in this domain, we know how to conduct a war 
which will always be below the level of generalized war, below the level of the 
atomic bomb. We will pull the strings: we know how to do it. We will do it through 
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intermediaries[…] we will try to apply this to the links that appear weakest to us, that 
is first of all the links in the chains of French colonial empire and the English 
colonial empire.”49 
 
  In this manner Lacheroy, Hogard, and Trinquier cast the revolutionary war as a theory of war 
on a grand scale: a subversive war in which what mattered was not just what was at stake, but 
how the game was being played. Or rather, how the other side was playing the game. Yet in 
order to appreciate this, one had to be alert to the peculiar insidiousness of what the theorists 
described as a state of war without war. 
 
As George Armstrong Kelly has written, in the hands of the French the theory of revolutionary 
war ‘claimed its essence from the war-politics continuum described by Clausewitz and opposed 
itself not to general nuclear war but to total peace. Peace, in the usually accepted sense, and la 
guerre révolutionnaire could be, indeed often were, coexistent.’50 Hogard put the matter in stark 
terms. What was new in the revolutionary war was ‘that “the state of peace” no longer exists and that 
political and military activities are now closely interlinked down to the lowest levels.’51 Atomic warfare 
was the red herring which allowed Moscow and Beijing to lead the war-below-the-bomb 
anywhere in the world in an attempt to encircle the West.52 In this context, what was most 
worrying was the thought that the revolutionary war might have come to the West itself. 
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  Hogard believed that it had. ‘We are thus at war,’ he wrote, ‘not only in Algeria, but throughout 
the Union française, even in the métropole.’53 Or, as he put it elsewhere: ‘Throughout the Union 
Française, the first or the second phase of the process of the revolutionary war is underway.’54 
That this could be so relied upon the belief that the processes which led to the loss of control in 
Indochina could be applied anywhere: the global enemy who had built ‘bases’ in the colonies – 
regions in which the population had been conquered in body and mind, and where the 
revolutionary enjoyed complete freedom of action – could do the same in the métropole. In this 
manner, it was possible to see the same loss of control to revolutionary forces unfurling globally: 
 
The “revolutionary war” is thus triggered the whole world over. Russia, China and 
certain satellites are already secure “bases” and numerous countries are in the 
process of “rotting” (pourissement), whilst the U.S.A. and perhaps Great Britain 
represent “provisionally occupied” zones […] A new world conflict (in the classic 
sense) would necessarily take place in this way, and would have the look of an 
Indochina war on a world scale, combining, according to the regions and the degree 
of rotting, a “war of movement” (which would in appearance resemble classic 
operations) and guerrilla action, both acting below “atomic” forms, but making full 
use of the “techniques” of conquest and control of the masses.55 
 
Confronting this reality required that some misconceptions about the nature of the communist 
threat be dropped. For one thing, Hogard suggested, it was wrong to think that French 
communists were ‘neither of the right, nor the left, but of the east.’ This formula obscured the 
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truth that ‘the communists are not “of the east” but everywhere, in France and throughout the 
world.’ The notion of the fifth column had to be abandoned: ‘the international communist party 
is not in the service of Russia […] it is international communism that conducts “its war”. The 
“Soviet Bloc” represents but one part of its power: its “bases”.56 
  Jean Némo expanded on these themes. Having joined the colonial infantry after graduation 
from Saint-Cyr in the promotion of 1924-1926, Némo was of similar vintage to Lacheroy. His 
service took him to Tonkin before the Second World War and on two further post-war tours, 
from 1946 to 1948, and from 1952 to 1955. In 1956 he attended the Institut des hautes études de la 
défense nationale. Unlike other prominent theorists, he garnered no direct practical experience of 
the war in Algeria: in 1958 he was promoted Brigadier General as commander of the Antilles-
Guyana group, implementing a ‘service militaire adapté’ for the DOM-TOMs.57 Over two articles 
in consecutive issues of the Revue de Défense Nationale in 1956, Némo developed an idea of the 
revolutionary war as a guerre dans la foule (war amongst the crowd) of global dimensions. His 
starting point was an analysis of the Indochina defeat which closely followed Lacheroy’s original 
formula. France was ‘practically alone in having encountered communism in action, in a vast 
guerre en surface [surface war/war without fronts] of a style and a scale hitherto unknown.’ The 
army was thus in a privileged position to understand that triumph of the Viet Minh came 
‘because they used their profound knowledge of the psychology and the structure of Vietnamese 
society, mobilised in a total war.’58 From this blueprint, Némo was able to argue for a concept of 
war which was, on one level, population-centric: this ‘war “amongst the crowd” makes of this 
crowd and its opinion the true stake.’ Yet this was a conception couched within the language of 
totality. As a consequence of the population being the stake, it was: ‘Illusory to want to find, for 
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the complex problems that present themselves, a simple solution; it is neither political nor 
military; it must be total, and current vocabulary can find no other word to qualify it.’59 ‘Total’ 
was not just a recognition of the means by which the Viet Minh had achieved politico-military 
mobilization; it was also a prescription for how any such war had to be fought. 
  Némo’s second article emphasized another measure of totality: scale. Nevertheless, he was at 
pains to make clear that within the bounds of ‘totality’ his concept of scale was different. Total 
war was habitually presented as ‘the extension of conflicts through increases of those carrying 
arms and of the number of persons directly implicated in the war.’ This was akin to traditional 
warfare writ large, with no attempt made to modify traditional concepts. Even in the nuclear age, 
visions of total war - in which limited numbers of professionals wielded ultra-modern, ultra-
scientific equipment - rested on the augmentation of war’s destructive character. Yet the post-
war record revealed multiple local conflicts which were decidedly low-tech, revolved around the 
people, lasted for years rather than days, and dispensed with traditional notions of military 
fronts. These conflicts confounded soldier and civilian alike, whose general response was to 
attempt clear categorisation:  
 
  One and the other say to each other these are the processes specific to “colonial” 
wars and retain for war, “real” war, that which takes place in the métropole or in 
Europe, the ideas that they have learnt to consider as sacrosanct. 
  There is thus an opposition between forecast and fact. Why not admit that what 
happened in Indochina, what is happening in North Africa could happen in Europe? 
It is quicker to deal with a difficult problem than to deny it! 
  In reality, we find ourselves in the presence of two crucial phenomena: the 
development of atomic and nuclear weapons on one hand, the intensification of 
ideological conflicts and their use for clearly “operational” ends on the other. It 
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would be just as dangerous to deny one as to minimise the other. Tomorrow’s war 
must be expected to use both in combination.60 
 
  What Némo was proposing was, he claimed, a ‘new geometry of warfare’ which blurred the 
boundaries between nuclear and guerrilla, regular and irregular, métropole and colony. 
Understanding this new geometry would prove crucial in facing up to a future war of an 
intensely ideological character: 
 
Appealing to all human resources, mobilising all energies, not by virtue of an order 
issued by a government authority but by the will of the individuals themselves to 
work for the triumph of a cause, employing weapons of great power and 
considerable scope, it deserves without doubt the label of “total war” or “global 
war.”61 
 
Within this global-total war France was in the thick of it. The United States and the USSR 
constituted the nodes (réduits), the geographical poles of the two opposing coalitions. Between 
these, however, lay vast ‘marches’, ‘the oceanic expanses on one side, and the allied countries, 
satellites or neutral,’ encompassing Western Europe, on the other. For the USA and the USSR 
the object was to destroy the opposing pole and to occupy the marches, ‘if possible with the 
assent, indeed the help of a sufficient portion of the population.’ In the marches, meanwhile: 
 
The dominant fact remains that the war will take place in the crowd, amongst the 
populations which, instead of being, as in the past, simple reservoirs of soldiers and 
labour and at the same time possible victims of blows, will participate effectively in 
operations, under a new form. It is the population that would be mobilised using 
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modern techniques, obtaining voluntary support from it, but mobilizing its social 
structure still further than in traditional armies.62 
 
  Given the urgency with which they felt the revolutionary war encroaching upon home soil, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that such writers were averse to half-measures in dealing with the 
revolutionary threat. Hogard, for instance, was adamant that negotiation was no solution. The 
revolutionaries held no thoughts of ‘partial victory’, seeking power for themselves only and the 
exclusion of all opposition. As such: 
 
If we deal with relatively moderate personalities, they are quickly ‘purified’; if we 
listen to the real chiefs of the movement, they envisage negotiation only as a means 
to increase their prestige and their influence over the populations, and to discourage 
our troops and our friends. […] Negotiation thus accelerates the process of the revolutionary 
war; and allows the rebels to trigger the general counter-offensive much more 
quickly.63 
 
The only solution was to adopt an uncompromisingly offensive posture. This meant eschewing 
more economic-based efforts aimed at the gentle persuasion of communities. Thus Chassin 
warned against the huge Western error in thinking that the first necessity was to fill men’s’ 
stomachs. Rather, he argued ‘it is the heart which must be filled first. If we want men to give 
their lives, something other than beefsteak or refrigerators must be offered to them. Appeal must 
be made to their deep feelings and a goal given to them to reach which seems grand and just.’64  
  Outwardly, this suggested that the political engagement of the people offered the key to victory, 
yet the revolutionary war theorists believed that the crowd was not influential, but rather existed 
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to be influenced. Lacheroy’s assertion in the first phase of his scénario-type de guerre révolutionnaire 
that ‘in the beginning, there is nothing’ was indicative of the manner in which the theorists 
heaped their attention on ‘methods and techniques, to the detriment of a study of the political, 
sociological, and economic terrain in which they are employed.’65 People were pawns, and 
ideology a scientific instrument in a war of manipulation. 
 
Such radical remedies served to underline how far the advocates of the modern war felt that the 
techniques of the old colonial conflicts were insufficient for confronting the war in progress. 
When used in France’s wars of decolonization, even where a degree of success had been 
achieved, for example during the année de Lattre of 1950-1951 in Indochina, the long term effects 
appeared limited. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny brought to Indochina longstanding techniques of 
French colonial warfare honed in Morocco between 1921 and 1926, under the command of one 
of the master practitioners, Hubert Lyautey.66 In fact, a number of his practices, such as the 
creation of groupes mobiles for rapid action, coupled with the establishment of a ‘de Lattre line’ of 
blockhouses and forts for the defence of the Red River delta, were strikingly reminiscent of the 
practice of Lyautey’s own mentor, Joseph Gallieni, in Tonkin six decades previously.67 De 
Lattre’s leadership and actions in 1951 succeeded in preventing the fall of Hanoi and offered a 
setback to Giap’s forces, prematurely assembled for a mass confrontation, but he could not save 
French Indochina. He had achieved only ‘a temporary stalemate.’68 
  Not that such methods were entirely defunct or without utility: the record of both the 
Indochina and Algeria Wars offers ample evidence of continuity of pre-Second World War 
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practices. Indeed, Porch goes so far as to suggest that ‘Operation Castor was nothing less than 
an updated oil spot – that is, the gradual expansion of a zone of pacification out of a secure base 
area through co-ordinated military, intelligence-gathering, economic, and political methods.’69 
The adoption of quadrillage in the Algerian countryside later that decade, a combination of grid-
marking and designated patrolling, coupled with mass resettlement, bore the hallmarks of an 
earlier age, albeit on a grander scale.70 Similarly, Craddock and Smith suggest that General 
Jacques Massu’s “surface method” adopted during the urban Battle of Algiers in 1956-7 
represented ‘merely an extension of the standard pacification approach in the rest of Algeria […] 
the quadrillage (squaring) system that involved the establishment of manned posts at 200 sensitive 
points across the city and 180 daily patrols of six men each.’71 Nevertheless, urban quadrillage was 
an adjunct effort to the wider army attempt to mould the principles of guerre révolutionnaire to an 
urban setting, while rural quadrillage can be seen as part of a ‘very reactive and dispersed strategy 
against the ALN’ which would only be remedied under the Challe Plan of 1959.72 
  On the ground, the old colonial methods could achieve a degree of geographical consolidation 
and impose a temporary order, but they were unable to fully confront the challenges posed by 
the new warfare – a contention reflected in the gradual reorganization of the curriculum of the 
CIPCG at Arzew away from tactical and towards psychological instruction.73 Given the emphasis 
placed by theorists on the novelty of modern war, this is perhaps unsurprising.74 At the same 
time, the French theorists of the 1950s also owed certain debts to pre-1939 currents of military-
political thought which help explain their post-1945 path to totality, although these currents were 
more metropolitan than colonial. 
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  One such debt lay in the roots of psychological warfare. Charles Lacheroy’s major reference 
point for the means by which totalitarianism achieved control was a book focused specifically on 
the European experience of the ‘maturation’ of totalitarian systems during the 1930s. Sergei 
Chakhotin’s The Rape of the Masses sought to analyse how ‘Fascism rapes the mind of the masses 
with its baleful propaganda’ using a framework which, Chakhotin explained in the preface to the 
English edition, aimed ‘to relate political action to the modern data of the exact sciences, to see 
whether, perhaps, political action is not primarily, like all human action, a form of biological 
behaviour.’75 His starting point was an investigation into how ‘physiological psychology’ could be 
brought to bear on the individual, following the work of his mentor Ivan Pavlov on conditioning 
reflexes in animals, developing inhibition or suggestibility. From the individual, he elevated the 
analysis to collective psychology. Although informed by Gustave Le Bon’s work on the 
psychology of crowds, Chakhotin disagreed with his tendency ‘to attribute to the crowd all the 
evils from which we suffer, and to hold it entirely responsible for the failures in the social and 
political life of our epoch,’ which he saw as indicative of ‘an exaggeration of the influence the 
crowd can really exert over the life of the State.’ The reality was:  
 
a diminution in the real influence of collectivities on public life: they are growing 
more and more into docile instruments in the hands of usurpers, dictators, who 
unscrupulously make use of their more or less intuitive apprehension of 
psychological laws, together with their control of the formidable technical 
equipment afforded by the modern State, to manipulate the individuals composing a 
people by a method we have called psychical rape.76 
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The only solution lay in adopting appropriate counter-measures: ‘to meet them with violent 
propaganda, to counteract their tendency to psychical rape by equivalent action on the psychism 
of the masses, but without recourse to lying.’ Here was the twist: in contrast to the totalitarian 
fascisms, the truth could be found in ‘the great myth of Socialism, of Love and humanity, of 
Liberty’, realisable courtesy of scientific techniques.77 
  Even after the cataclysm of 1939-1945, for some French army officers the tools of ‘psychical 
rape’ remained as relevant as ever. In 1948 an infantry officer named Antoine Argoud wrote a 
two part article for the Revue de Défense Nationale entitled ‘La Guerre Psychologique.’78 His 
argument cleaved tight to Chakhotin’s formulation, encompassing the objective psychology of 
Pavlov’s conditioned responses, collective psychology and the control of crowds and masses, 
and on to propaganda, the essential tool of psychological warfare. The basis of psychological 
warfare was simple: 
 
[It] consists in the application to masses or crowds of the theory of conditioned 
reflexes. This has only been possible, with precision, from the day on which the 
development of scientific progress permitted the diffusion of ideas on a sufficient 
scale. The radio post, the press and the cinema are the indispensable auxiliaries to 
the theory of conditioned responses.79 
 
Up to 1940, the Nazi regime appeared to offer the most startling example of how psychological 
warfare could succeed, and in the aftermath of the Second World War the Soviet Union 
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represented the greatest threat. Argoud was equally aware of the success of the United States in 
studying ‘scientifically and systematically […] the most appropriate means to ruin the moral of 
the adversary, amongst troops as well as in the rear, or to preserve the morale of their own 
nationals.’80 Furthermore, he saw that, owing to the marshalling of public opinion under its 
democratic system, the USA had been ‘one of the first countries to have applied the art of 
propaganda to the government of civil society in a systematic manner.’ Whilst he stressed that 
the American example ‘offers no similarity, besides the technical aspect, with the propaganda of 
Hitler or Stalin,’ it nevertheless offered proof that propaganda need not be enacted solely 
through the negative means of violence and censorship. Manipulation might equally consist of 
positive means: documentation, information, education.81 
   As early as 1948, it was clear to Argoud that psychological warfare continued to play a crucial 
role in the struggle of liberal democracy against communism, and required that the government 
employ all means of propaganda - radio, press, theatre, posters – throughout the Union française 
or risk disappearing from the ‘world chessboard.’82 A future leader of the OAS, Argoud was far 
from a stranger to the revolutionary war in the late 1950s and early 1960s: with his first posting 
to Algeria in 1956 he began to reorient his thoughts away from the possibilities of armoured 
warfare in Europe which had preoccupied him in the years immediately preceding his arrival. He 
spent the next half decade attempting ‘to change the army’s doctrine using the principles of guerre 
révolutionnaire.’83 Arriving in March 1956, by September he had written a report on ‘The Military 
Problem in Algeria’ in which he implored the command to focus their efforts on rallying the 
people above targeting the rebels.84 Although the report made no explicit reference to 
psychological action, Argoud’s earlier interest can only have strengthened his belief in the pursuit 
of the political and social dimensions of the struggle. For men such as Lacheroy, Hogard, Némo 
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and Argoud, the Chakhotin-esque idea of the manipulability of the masses showed not only how 
the new war had been radicalised, but equally how radicalization offered the key to victory. 
  Another pre-Second World War debt lay in the contention, succinctly put by Hogard, that ‘“the 
state of peace” no longer exists.’85 Here, the revolutionary war theorists subscribed to ideas about the 
enlarged parameters of warfare that had been bestowed upon the world by totalitarianism, a 
development as much European as colonial, and enunciated by André Beaufre.86 Less than a 
month before the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, Beaufre published an article in 
the Revue des Deux Mondes, in which he argued that a new intermediate stage in international 
conflict, called la paix-guerre (peace-war, or war in peacetime), had been created. This was the 
product of industrial nations’ increasing capacity to wage technologically-driven, highly 
destructive warfare that could result only in military stalemate, and that would require such 
efforts to win, and incur such losses and destruction, that even the most advantageous of peace 
conditions would not be worth the cost. The paix-guerre rested on the idea that in such a climate 
the fear of catastrophic war would allow for manoeuvring by which a nation might achieve the 
ends of war through the capitulation of the opponent and without recourse to open conflict, so 
long as a ‘critical point’ leading to total war could be avoided. 
  To Beaufre this situation was in some sense analogous to strategy as practiced in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when battle was the worst possible outcome and the best 
strategists wore down their opponents without recourse to it. The conditions under which the 
paix-guerre operated were of course different, as competing nations sought to bring various means 
of pressure to bear upon their opponents - which Beaufre labelled guerre politique, guerre economique, 
guerre diplomatique – all of which operated outside the parameters of war classically conceived. 
Nevertheless, it was his hope that the existence and observance of the paix-guerre might even 
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have a de-escalatory effect on armed conflict so that ‘we will be able in the future to witness 
relatively important military conflicts, conducted with both sides careful to engage only limited 
effectives.’ He even harboured the hope that ‘if passion or destiny leads to the outbreak of a total 
war and that the military resolution seems uncertain or far-off, it will transform itself into a 
measured war, with limited military and political objectives.87 
  This optimistic prognosis was swiftly dashed by subsequent events. Several decades later, 
however, Beaufre was able to present the concept as a valid prediction of ‘the pattern of the cold 
war’ in which war was ‘total […] in other words it will be carried on in all fields, political, 
economic, diplomatic and military.’ His resolution was that ‘equally therefore strategy must be 
total.’88 Indeed, where Beaufre was most consistent, in the 1960s as in the 1930s, was in his 
emphasis on the enlarged dimensions of strategy. The paix-guerre might be instrumental in 
ushering in a new era of limited wars, but such conflicts would have to be conducted within 
much wider strategic parameters. To put it another way, these limited wars consisted within a 
total strategy which could no longer be confined to military operations: 
 
Since war engages all domains, strategy must embrace the game fully, as much to 
guide the choice of factors to be used as to bind the various elements of manoeuvre 
to each other. This total strategy, as we can call it, is not only necessary for the 
direction of total war, but also for the conduct of the new war, of a form so 
insidious and diverse that we have been able to believe that it was nothing but a 
deceptive aspect of peace.89 
 
Reacting to the ‘new war’ was not a matter of choice, but a necessity thrust upon liberal 
democratic societies in the face of totalitarian regimes which refused, by their very nature, to 
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respect any boundary between states of war and peace. Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
the realm of the guerre politique – ‘the most characteristic process of the paix-guerre […] that is to 
say intervention in the internal politics of the opposing country.’90 
  After 1945, although the enemy had changed, the enlarged parameters of conflict remained. If 
there was a difference between Beaufre’s 1930s understanding and that of the revolutionary war 
theorists of the 1950s, however, it lay in the attitude of those confronting the insidious war.91 
Beaufre’s conception of the paix-guerre as an intermediate stage in war appeared as a vehicle to 
approach conflict at the broadest possible level without advocating the notion of a constant state 
of war on the liberal-democratic side. In essence, and despite that the idea of total strategy itself 
blurred the line between the state of war and the state of peace, it offered the hope that you did 
not have to join them in order to beat them. Even by the time Argoud was writing about 
psychological warfare, that distinction was disappearing. Psychological warfare had rendered war 
‘total’ and ‘permanent’ in a more immediate sense, meaning that the government now had a duty 
to put psychological warfare into practice for its own ends, and as part of its daily routine. The 
revolutionary warriors took these ideas on and pushed them forward, and in so doing were 
seduced by the call to unlimited response that such an escalatory logic demanded. For Lacheroy 
and his contemporaries the revolutionary war marked ‘a step further, but an immense step in the 
direction of this total war towards which, alas, the world seems unavoidably to be heading.’92 In a 
sense, the theory of revolutionary war took la paix-guerre to the colonies, by way of psychological 
warfare, with radicalized results.  
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Of course, the totalizing theory of la guerre révolutionnaire cannot solely explain the dark avenues 
trodden by elements of the French army which led them to the use of torture and to the coups 
of 1958 and 1961. The theory may have served as a force driving its adherents in a radical 
direction, but the wider move towards radicalism on the part of the army can also be understood 
as a consequence of traumas experienced since the rupture of June 1940, if not before.93 The 
political radicalism of the army, which was part and parcel of that move, also relied on other 
preconditions. Paret, for example, recognized that in rediscovering the ‘techniques developed 
and codified by French colonial officers before World War I’ the revolutionary warriors echoed 
tenets held by the earlier generation: chiefly ‘unity of command (which, in effect, meant military 
domination over civilian affairs)’ and the inclination to seek a role in national regeneration that 
could be traced back to Lyautey’s famous articles of the 1890s on the social and colonial roles of 
the army. Reborn ‘in a more virulent form’ in the 1930s’, this inclination endured through the 
Vichy regime and ‘survived the coming of the Fourth Republic, until gradually faith in the 
messianic power of the Army and willingness to use the Army for a coup d’état merged in the 
activist groups of the 1950’s.’94 
  Yet as this article has shown, whereas such developments may have in effect opened the door 
to political interventionism, the escalatory logic of the theory of revolutionary war gave 
adherents the impetus to walk through it. A certain concept of total war was at the heart of this. 
Since the revolutionary war was being fought both abroad and at home, it was all but inevitable 
that the revolutionary warriors would come to hold that the ‘proper indoctrination of the French 
nation was as important as indoctrinating colonial populations.’95 The link they forged between 
colonial war and domestic security encouraged them to envisage their conflicts as national 
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emergencies. The army needed to assert its stewardship over a people either ignorant of the 
ideological war in which they were embroiled, or already indoctrinated by an opposing ideology. 
Thus Némo could argue that: ‘As regards in particular the army and its cadres, their roots must 
thrust deep into the real country (pays réel) […] Through its army, just as through its politics, the 
country must be involved in the war; if not it becomes disinterested and this is the first step 
toward abandonment and defeat.’96 
  Perceptive individuals saw that it was rather the politicization of the army that offered a first 
step towards defeat, and in this sense the logic of the theory was self-defeating. Paret’s 
contemporary assessment was particularly astute. ‘What effect might a military élite with a sense 
of mission, and a lack of trust in the reliability of its base, have on this base?’ he asked:  
 
If the French Army were a revolutionary force its first move, according to La Guerre 
Révolutionnaire, should be to conquer and secure this base. But the Army – whatever 
the opinions held by some of its members – is not really, in its essentials, 
revolutionary; and one may expect the doctrine eventually to break up over the 
contradiction of imposing revolutionary methods on non-revolutionary 
organizations.97 
 
The decline of la guerre révolutionnaire - with the creation of a new Republic and the return of de 
Gaulle - appeared to bear that out, even if the interventionist tendency would return a few short 
years later. 
  Nor was it the case that the army in its entirety was ever fully won over to theory. In this 
regard, an apocryphal remark attributed to de Gaulle is perhaps telling. When approached by a 
junior officer who attempted to engage him on the subject, the General retorted: ‘I know of two 
types of warfare: mobile warfare and positional warfare. I have never heard of revolutionary 
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warfare.’98 Although by now out of uniform, de Gaulle’s sentiment may have been shared by 
many in service. Even during its ascendency as a training centre, reports emanating from the 
CIPCG at Arzew suggest that ‘the minds of a great many cadres, officers and NCOs, were not 
very receptive, were indeed hostile, to psychological warfare.’99 At the same time, as a staging 
post for those whose trajectories culminated in a rift with Republican government, the influence 
of the theory is undeniable. Serendipitous events rendered both Galula and Trinquier as 
centurions-manqués.100 Lacheroy the theorist and Argoud the practitioner, meanwhile, received 
death sentences in absentia for their part in the April 1961 coup attempt.101 Understanding the 
totality inherent in their conception of revolutionary war makes some sense of the path they 
chose. 
  In the words of Dennis Showalter:  
For almost a decade after 1954, French military intellectuals developed and pursued 
the concept of guerre revolutionnaire. This amalgam of ideological anti-Communism, 
socio-economic reform, psychological warfare and high-intensity military operations 
carried by élite forces, came in Algeria close to Clausewitz’s most abstract vision of 
total war before collapsing because its rigorously logical intellectual coherence could 
not respond to untidy facts.’102  
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The most untidy fact was that the conceptualisation of war they had created did not correspond 
to the reality of the conflict in Algeria. Throughout the 1950s the revolutionary war theorists 
drew on a narrative of totality which did not end in 1945 but was reaching apotheosis in the 
post-Second World War wars of empire. Much like the Viet Minh’s own efforts, such an 
unconventional concept of total war underscores Hew Strachan’s contention that a ‘total war 
need not be modern: a modern war need not be total.’103 Here was a war which was, in many 
respects, de-technologized – a total war of mind rather than materiel. Yet it was a total war that 
existed in mind alone. In 1960 Paret observed that ‘although modern war has blurred the 
dividing lines between internal and external operations, these still exist’, thus laying bare the 
fantasy of the theory.104 It was one thing for military personnel to mobilise for a subversive war 
below the nuclear horizon, but quite another to expect French civil society to mobilize for an 
existential struggle. The dynamic of war might be totalizing for the Vietnamese and the 
Algerians, but it simply was not so for the French. For France’s revolutionary warriors, however, 
the intellectual barrier between limited and unlimited war had crumbled, giving way to a total war 
they perceived as immediate, urgent, and very real. 
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